Legal capacity

Strong evidence

A city cannot build homes it has made illegal.

Legalize real projects across enough land and builders respond. Auckland did this at city scale and saw a large permitting boom; narrower reforms have usually delivered less.

What this does not mean: Permission is necessary but not sufficient. Financing, land, construction costs, approval time, and demand determine whether newly legal homes are actually built.

Figures from the papers

Inspect the published evidence directly

Study chart · redrawn

Figure 2 · Living space after upzoning

The strongest post-reform increases appear after roughly five years, especially for large upzonings.

REDRAWN FROM STUDY DATAFigure 2 · Living space after upzoning
Figure 2 · Living space after upzoningThe strongest post-reform increases appear after roughly five years, especially for large upzonings. Values digitized from Figure 2; the long-run all-treatment value is checked against the paper’s approximately 9% estimate in the archived publication; minor reading error is possible.-5%0%5%10%15%Living-space effect (%)Years relative to upzoningAll upzoningsLarge upzoningsSmall upzoningsUPZONING−4−1+2+5+8+9
Figure 2 · Living space after upzoning. Values digitized from Figure 2; the long-run all-treatment value is checked against the paper’s approximately 9% estimate in the archived publication; minor reading error is possible.
Years relative to upzoningAll upzoningsLarge upzoningsSmall upzonings
−4-1-20
−30-10
−2-10-1
−1000
0000
+1010
+2121
+3241
+4362
+5593
+66114
+77135
+88155
+99166

Source: Büchler & Lutz (2024), Figure 2; PDF p. 8.

Read carefully: The outcome is living space, and local quality-adjusted rent differences were not statistically clear.

Study chart · redrawn

Figure 6 · Estimated treatment effects on dwelling permits

The estimated effects become positive after the reform for both attached and detached homes.

REDRAWN FROM STUDY DATAFigure 6 · Estimated treatment effects on dwelling permits
Figure 6 · Estimated treatment effects on dwelling permitsThe estimated effects become positive after the reform for both attached and detached homes. Values digitized from Figure 6 in the archived publication; minor reading error is possible.00.5011.5Additional permits per areaYears relative to reformAll dwellingsAttachedDetachedUPZONING−4−20+2+4+5
Figure 6 · Estimated treatment effects on dwelling permits. Values digitized from Figure 6 in the archived publication; minor reading error is possible.
Years relative to reformAll dwellingsAttachedDetached
−4-0.050-0.02
−30-0.020
−20.0200
−1000
00.10.050.04
+10.250.150.1
+20.450.30.15
+30.750.550.2
+41.150.850.28
+51.451.050.35

Source: Greenaway-McGrevy & Phillips (2023), Figure 6; PDF p. 34.

Read carefully: The outcome is permits per statistical area, not completed homes; the control comparison relies on non-upzoned areas.

Study chart · redrawn

Figure 2 · Average number of addresses before and after reform

The two groups track similarly before reform and separate gradually afterward.

REDRAWN FROM STUDY DATAFigure 2 · Average number of addresses before and after reform
Figure 2 · Average number of addresses before and after reformThe two groups track similarly before reform and separate gradually afterward. Values digitized from Figure 2 in the archived publication; minor reading error is possible.100102104106108Normalized address countYears relative to reformLess restrictive reformMore restrictive reformREFORM−5−2+1+4+7+8
Figure 2 · Average number of addresses before and after reform. Values digitized from Figure 2 in the archived publication; minor reading error is possible.
Years relative to reformLess restrictive reformMore restrictive reform
−5100100
−4100.2100.2
−3100.5100.5
−2100.8100.8
−1101.1101.1
0101.4101.4
+1102101.8
+2102.8102.3
+3103.6102.9
+4104.7103.5
+5105.6104
+6106.6104.5
+7107.6105
+8108105.4

Source: Stacy et al. (2023), Figure 2; PDF p. 11.

Read carefully: The reforms differ across cities, and the observational design cannot eliminate every reason places reform when they do.

Study chart · redrawn

Figure 3 · Cumulative residential units permitted

Chicago's cumulative permit paths changed unevenly across neighborhoods and rule types.

REDRAWN FROM STUDY DATAFigure 3 · Cumulative residential units permitted
Figure 3 · Cumulative residential units permittedChicago's cumulative permit paths changed unevenly across neighborhoods and rule types. Values digitized from Figure 3; six original panels condensed into the three policy comparisons in the archived publication; minor reading error is possible.03006009001,200Cumulative permitted unitsReform exposureAffected parcelsComparison parcelsDensity incr…Parking refo…Both changes
Figure 3 · Cumulative residential units permitted. Values digitized from Figure 3; six original panels condensed into the three policy comparisons in the archived publication; minor reading error is possible.
Reform exposureAffected parcelsComparison parcels
Density increase410460
Parking reform720690
Both changes560520

Source: Freemark (2020), Figure 3; PDF p. 21.

Read carefully: The reforms covered narrow station areas, and the study observed only the first several post-reform years.

Evidence stack

Studies behind this conclusion

Greenaway-McGrevy & Phillips, 2023Peer reviewed

The Impact of Upzoning on Housing Construction in Auckland

A broad reform covering roughly three quarters of residential land produced a large increase in permitted homes relative to non-upzoned areas.

21,808 additional permitted homes over five years

Keep in mind: Permits are not the same as completed or net new occupied homes.

Study details →
Anagol, Ferreira & Rexer, 2026Peer reviewed

Estimating the Economic Value of Zoning Reform

Allowing more floor area increased multifamily development activity and availability; the authors' equilibrium model predicts a larger housing stock and lower prices over time.

Modeled long run: 1.9% more housing and 0.5% lower prices citywide

Keep in mind: The price figures are structural simulations, not direct rent estimates, and the reform produced gains and losses for different owners and residents.

Study details →
Büchler & Lutz, 2024Peer reviewed

Making Housing Affordable? The Local Effects of Relaxing Land-Use Regulation

Substantial upzonings increased housing over five to ten years, especially where prior zoning was binding and rents signaled strong demand.

About 9% more living space and housing units in upzoned areas after five to ten years

Keep in mind: Local quality-adjusted rents did not differ significantly from later-upzoned controls; effects may diffuse across the wider market, and the setting is one Swiss canton.

Study details →
Stacy et al., 2023Peer reviewed

Land-Use Reforms and Housing Costs

Loosening reforms were followed by modest average supply gains, while tightening reforms reduced middle-income-affordable units and raised rents.

Loosening was associated with 0.8% more housing after 3–9 years

Keep in mind: Reforms are heterogeneous and the cross-city design remains observational.

Study details →
Freemark, 2020Peer reviewed

Upzoning Chicago

Narrow transit-area upzonings raised affected property values but did not produce detectable additional housing during the five-year study window.

Keep in mind: A localized reform and limited horizon may behave differently from broad reform.

Study details →

From evidence to policy

Reforms connected to this claim

01Make room for apartments, shops, and neighborsStop reserving most well-located land for the most expensive kind of home. Let more people live near jobs, schools, shops, and opportunity.02Bring back the homes between a house and a high-riseDuplexes, fourplexes, cottages, courtyard apartments, and rowhouses once made ordinary neighborhoods work. Let them belong again.03Let homeowners add a homeA backyard cottage, garage apartment, or basement home can house a parent, a renter, a caregiver, or the next generation.04Stop forcing every home to buy parkingBuilders can still provide parking. Just stop hiding a mandatory space—and its cost—inside every apartment.05Put more homes where the connections already areA train station surrounded by housing bans is a public investment surrounded by a private waiting list. Let more people live within reach.06Set clear rules—and say yes on timeDebate the rules in public. Then approve homes that follow them without years of hearings, bargaining, appeals, and delay.