The starting point

Established evidence

Scarcity turns neighbors into bidders.

When more households want in than there are homes available, the highest bidders win. Everyone else pays more, accepts less, moves farther away, doubles up, or leaves.

What this does not mean: Construction costs, incomes, interest rates, amenities, and migration matter too. Housing supply is not the only force—it is the part local policy can directly obstruct or enable.

Figures from the papers

Inspect the published evidence directly

Study chart · redrawn

Figure 2 · Average number of addresses before and after reform

The two groups track similarly before reform and separate gradually afterward.

REDRAWN FROM STUDY DATAFigure 2 · Average number of addresses before and after reform
Figure 2 · Average number of addresses before and after reformThe two groups track similarly before reform and separate gradually afterward. Values digitized from Figure 2 in the archived publication; minor reading error is possible.100102104106108Normalized address countYears relative to reformLess restrictive reformMore restrictive reformREFORM−5−2+1+4+7+8
Figure 2 · Average number of addresses before and after reform. Values digitized from Figure 2 in the archived publication; minor reading error is possible.
Years relative to reformLess restrictive reformMore restrictive reform
−5100100
−4100.2100.2
−3100.5100.5
−2100.8100.8
−1101.1101.1
0101.4101.4
+1102101.8
+2102.8102.3
+3103.6102.9
+4104.7103.5
+5105.6104
+6106.6104.5
+7107.6105
+8108105.4

Source: Stacy et al. (2023), Figure 2; PDF p. 11.

Read carefully: The reforms differ across cities, and the observational design cannot eliminate every reason places reform when they do.

Study chart · redrawn

Figure 3 · Modeled house prices after removing supply constraints

The modeled price path is lower when regulatory and physical constraints are removed.

REDRAWN FROM STUDY DATAFigure 3 · Modeled house prices after removing supply constraints
Figure 3 · Modeled house prices after removing supply constraintsThe modeled price path is lower when regulatory and physical constraints are removed. Values digitized from Figure 3; regulatory counterfactual checked against the reported 16.3% average reduction in the archived publication; minor reading error is possible.050,000100,000150,000200,000250,000Average house price (£)YearPredicted priceWithout regulatory cons…Without physical constr…197419821990199820062008
Figure 3 · Modeled house prices after removing supply constraints. Values digitized from Figure 3; regulatory counterfactual checked against the reported 16.3% average reduction in the archived publication; minor reading error is possible.
YearPredicted priceWithout regulatory constraintWithout physical constraint
1974220002200022000
1978260002500025000
1982300002900029000
1986410003800039000
1990720006500067000
1994650005800060000
1998850007400077000
2002140000112000120000
2006210000165000180000
2008220000178000190000

Source: Hilber & Vermeulen (2016), Figure 3; PDF p. 38.

Read carefully: These are instrumental-variable model counterfactuals for England, not the observed effect of one reform.

Study chart · redrawn

Figure 4 · Estimated effects of restrictions on housing productivity

Across calibrated assumptions, the model attributes a positive cost wedge to regulatory restrictions.

REDRAWN FROM STUDY DATAFigure 4 · Estimated effects of restrictions on housing productivity
Figure 4 · Estimated effects of restrictions on housing productivityAcross calibrated assumptions, the model attributes a positive cost wedge to regulatory restrictions. Values reconstructed from quantities reported by the authors at Figure 4; average calibration anchored to the authors’ reported 15-point estimate.0 pp10 pp20 pp30 ppAdded housing-cost wedge (percentage points)Calibrated restriction levelHousing-cost wedgeLow regulati…Average regu…High regulat…
Figure 4 · Estimated effects of restrictions on housing productivity. Values reconstructed from quantities reported by the authors at Figure 4; average calibration anchored to the authors’ reported 15-point estimate.
Calibrated restriction levelHousing-cost wedge
Low regulation0
Average regulation15
High regulation30

Source: Albouy & Ehrlich (2018), Figure 4; PDF p. 44.

Read carefully: The magnitude comes from a structural model and depends on assumptions about costs, substitution, amenities, and location choices.

Evidence stack

Studies behind this conclusion

Glaeser & Gyourko, 2003Peer reviewed

The Impact of Building Restrictions on Housing Affordability

In expensive markets, home prices often exceed construction costs by far more than ordinary land costs can explain, implicating limits on building.

Keep in mind: This is an indirect, cross-sectional test rather than an evaluation of one reform.

Study details →
Hilber & Vermeulen, 2016Peer reviewed

The Impact of Supply Constraints on House Prices in England

Housing prices responded more strongly to demand in places with tighter regulatory and physical supply constraints.

Their counterfactual model estimates 16.3% lower prices in an average travel-to-work area without regulatory constraints

Keep in mind: The 16.3% figure is a modeled counterfactual, not the observed effect of one reform, and the setting is England.

Study details →
Albouy & Ehrlich, 2018Peer reviewed

Housing Productivity and the Social Cost of Land-Use Restrictions

The authors estimate that land-use restrictions make housing substantially more expensive and impose net social costs in high-demand metropolitan areas.

Modeled restrictions raise housing costs about 15 percentage points and reduce welfare by 2.3% of income

Keep in mind: These are structural-model estimates that depend on assumptions about land, construction, amenities, and household location choices.

Study details →
Stacy et al., 2023Peer reviewed

Land-Use Reforms and Housing Costs

Loosening reforms were followed by modest average supply gains, while tightening reforms reduced middle-income-affordable units and raised rents.

Loosening was associated with 0.8% more housing after 3–9 years

Keep in mind: Reforms are heterogeneous and the cross-city design remains observational.

Study details →

From evidence to policy

Reforms connected to this claim

02Bring back the homes between a house and a high-riseDuplexes, fourplexes, cottages, courtyard apartments, and rowhouses once made ordinary neighborhoods work. Let them belong again.05Put more homes where the connections already areA train station surrounded by housing bans is a public investment surrounded by a private waiting list. Let more people live within reach.06Set clear rules—and say yes on timeDebate the rules in public. Then approve homes that follow them without years of hearings, bargaining, appeals, and delay.